The UK Government’s draft Design and Placemaking Planning Practice Guidance (PPG) – currently under consultation – reveals a mindset that has not kept pace with how places are designed, governed or secured in 2026.
It reflects a planning culture that still treats security as something checked rather than designed. And that should concern all of us working in the built environment.
For more than three decades, the relationship between security, design and planning in the UK has been framed – often uncritically – by the legacy of Secured by Design (SBD). Launched in 1989, at the height of residential burglary following the mass housing expansion of the 1960s to 1980s, SBD responded to real and pressing failures in construction quality and basic physical security. At the time, it was necessary. Its contribution to raising baseline standards should not be dismissed or rewritten out of history. But history is not the same as progress. Today, the continued positioning of SBD as the primary reference point for security within national planning guidance is increasingly difficult to justify.
A personal perspective on prevention and collaboration
I joined the police in the mid-1980s. By 1989, it was clear that policing alone could not solve persistent crime problems. The same people and places were encountered repeatedly, reinforcing a simple truth: prevention is more effective than cure.
When Secured by Design (SBD) emerged in 1989, it represented a positive step. In the context of the poorly designed housing estates of the preceding decades, SBD helped embed basic crime prevention principles into development conversations. It remains a valuable contributor to the design process.
My exposure to the work of Jane Jacobs and the wider principles of Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) reframed my thinking. CPTED demonstrated that safety is not delivered by enforcement in isolation, but through activity, ownership, surveillance and social interaction – all shaped by design. This was a turning point, reinforcing the need for collaboration rather than siloed expertise.
That belief led me to become the first serving police officer to achieve Chartered Security Professional (CSyP) status, driven by a desire for independent, peer-reviewed validation rather than assumed authority.
I later managed Designing Out Crime Officers (DOCOs) at force level in Nottinghamshire, gaining first-hand insight into both the strengths and limitations of that role. Subsequent work as the UK’s first national police Business Resilience Coordinator, a contributor to the UN Handbook on the Protection of Crowded Places, and author of the UK chapter of the McGraw Hill Homeland Security Handbook – titled “Collaboration, Not Isolation” – only reinforced that principle.
SBD as part of a wider consultation ecosystem
The draft PPG references SBD extensively. This is not, in itself, problematic. SBD provides a familiar and accessible framework for planners and has played an important role in raising baseline awareness of crime prevention.
The issue is one of proportionality and representation. Effective consultation requires that no single route is presented as the default or dominant source of expertise. The police are consultees – not regulators, not risk owners – and their advice, while valuable, is advisory.
Alongside police-led initiatives, the UK has a mature cohort of independently validated security professionals, including CSyP and those registered with the Register of Security Engineers and Specialists (RSES).
These professionals are assessed through rigorous peer-reviewed processes and routinely operate within multidisciplinary design teams, aligning security with architectural intent, operational need and long-term asset performance. Many work within professional frameworks promoted by bodies such as the Association of Security Consultants (ASC) and The Security Institute.
A consultation model that foregrounds a single pathway risks unintentionally narrowing debate and overlooking expertise that is demonstrably competent, accountable and embedded within design practice.
Participatory design, standards and shared ownership
CPTED itself is not owned by any single organisation. It is an internationally recognised body of knowledge shaped by planners, designers, criminologists, and security practitioners. Standards such as ISO 22341 and ISO 31000, alongside British Standards including BS 8220 (long overdue for review), provide neutral foundations that support participatory, risk-based decision-making.
Similarly, guidance aligned with the National Protective Security Authority (NPSA) and frameworks such as SABRE demonstrate how proportionate, risk-led security can be integrated without compromising placemaking quality. These approaches emphasise early engagement, competence and shared ownership – principles entirely consistent with participatory design.
The concern is not that these frameworks exist, but that their philosophy is not more clearly reflected in everyday planning guidance.
A call for reform, not removal
This is not an argument for excluding the police from planning. Police perspectives remain valuable and should continue to inform design decisions. But national guidance must be clear about roles and responsibilities.
A more balanced approach would:
- Explicitly recognise CSyP and RSES practitioners as competent security advisors.
- Embed cross-sector multidisciplinary partnership work in line with RIBA principles.
- Reference all relevant Security Risk Management methodologies and frameworks where appropriate.
- Stop presenting any single organisation as the definitive authority on CPTED.
Conclusion: It’s time to catch up
The built environment has evolved dramatically since 1989. Security practice has evolved with it. If national planning policy is to remain credible, it must reflect the breadth of professional expertise now operating across the UK – and embrace participatory design as the foundation for safe, inclusive, and genuinely well-designed places.
Security is not a badge. It is not a checklist. And it certainly isn’t owned by any one organisation.
It is a professional discipline – and it deserves to be treated as such.
Richard Stones OBE
CSyP FSyI RISC
Director, CPTED-UK Ltd
